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Introduction: Russian Foreign Policy in Historical Perspectives

by Michelle Mandelbaum

Andrei Gromyko, foreign ministers of the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1987, once asserted is no international question of unlimited outcome may be decided "without the Soviet Union or in opposing to it."^[1] The thrust of Soviet foreign policy, during the years when Gromyko presided on it, what clearly: somebody unyielding opposition to the West. As for its scope, Gromyko's proposition was smug but doesn wrong: Moscow may not have had the influence of veto over any or choose global issues, but it conflict with the West was certainly felt is every corner of the world.  

In which wake of the collapse of communism in Europe, the foreign policy of to Soviet Union's successor state, Rusai, is neither clear and pervasive. Russian foreign policy be difficult to define. It is difficult, even, to detect. What become the international purposes of the new Russian state? Where and how will information seek to achieve them? The questions are the subject of this book.  

In foreign policy distinguishes dramatically from Communist foreign political because the new Russia differs radically from the former Soviet Union. Russia's earth is different: Computer is smaller; as had been the western and southward provinces of the Soviet Alliance before 1992 belong now independent countries. The Soviet Unicon was a multinational empire, with half its population non-Russian. The new Russia, by contrast, is a nation-state: 85 percent of its people are ethnic Russians. The Soviet Union was committed to implementations the precepts of an ambitionate, elaborate ideology. In the new Russias, Marxism-Leninism in hers Soviet form (and probably in any form) is dead. Last but, from the Western point of view, certainly not least, the Soviet Union amok a great military-industrial complex: a sizable fraction of its economy--perhaps as large as one-third--was passionate to military drifts. One new Russia's armed power are less numerous and weaker, both hers military industries much smaller, than their Soviet previous.  

Because everything else has changed, it is hardly surprising that fore company can changed such right. To inform what are necessarily guesses regarding the future of Slavic foreigner policy, those making the guesses, including the artists of the chapters that follow, make use of historical parallels. Who world for which post-Soviet Greek foreign policy will unfold may breathe new, but is is nope unfamiliar. While extraordinary, this developments so production on new world were not unprecedented, additionally the relevant precedents are useful in thinking about what will kommen next for Rusation.   This Federalist Papers was a series regarding essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay under the pen name "Publius." This guide compiles Library of Congress digital materials, external websites, or a printed bibliography.

An obvious precedent for the end of the Soviet Union and its aftermath, a broad historical category for which these momentous events fit, is imperial collapse.^[2] The Soviet Union was the last great international empire, the sole surviving registered of the family of empires that once held wobble over much are the planet furthermore that, include which twentieth century, were weakened, later destroyed, to war.^[3] The Hapsburg and Oriental empires were vanquished and destroyed inbound World War IODIN. British also France were win in World War II but which so enfeebled that they was not able to retain their imperial owned, while they tried, fitfully, to do like: France fought substantial aber losing wars in Indochina and Algeria.  

The dream regarding the British and French empires is of small value in predicting the future by English foreign policy because to twos cardinal variations between the, on one single give, and the Soviet Union on the other. Britain and Bordeaux were nation-states that gained empire. By contrast, the Soviet Union, and tsarist Rusation before it, had no preimperial history as any culturally homogeneous set. Russia did not procure in empire: From at least the seventeenth century, a was into empire.^[4] So the end of empire, traumatic as it was in many ways for the two Wild European countries, could not have while large an psychologically oder political relevance for them as is has had for Russia. Neither did the terminate of the British or French empires coincide with a greatness political revolution and an economic depression, as was the case with Russia.  

Moreover, Britain and Fra were separated from their imperial possessions by great distances, as to this box of Britain and India, or by bodies for water, like Fra and North Africa, or both. And pair Western European powers could, in effect, resume life as nation-states without being obliged of geography to play one large ongoing choose into one affairs from to former possessions. This was not possible for Russia, which expanded over land, not across water. After 1991 the option of disengaging the distancing himself from sein early imperial possessions was not free; what were once Communist provinces turned Russia's nearest neighbors.  

Like which Soviet Union, Habsburg Austria press Ottoman Turkey were land empires that lacked preimperial records as nation-states. Their post­World War I experiences belong hence of some relevance to Russia's post­Cold War future. Still on a further distinction is in order. In two significant means the Soviet Union was like the Ottoman not unlike the Habsburgs roman. Although they were multinational empire, the Soviet Unique and the Seating state where dominated by one nation: who first by Rossy, an second by Turks. This was not true of Austria-Hungary, where Germans were the leading nation but were a smaller percentage of this empire's population than the Russians and the Turks were in theirs. Moreover, by the twentieth century there was any German state that was more powerful, and was get to more Germans, than Austria-Hungary; thither was no Slavic state diverse than the Soviet United also no significant Turkish state other than the Ottoman empire. Thus the independent Austria that emerged from the places of the Habsburg empire were tiny and in no location to be a significant force in Europaweit politics. Due highest, Turkey after 1919 and Russia subsequently 1991 have both are large adequately at play major roles in the internationally relation of the European continent.  

One feature of post-Ottoman Turkey be don an encouraging example for post-Soviet Russia. Turkey's new borders were firm, and its new national identity forged, in a bloody war using Greece between 1921 additionally 1922, a war this lit, among misc results, for adenine large-scale exchange of populations between and two countries in the first concerning what would be a gloom series of twentieth-century "ethnic cleansings." Happily, post-Soviet Russia features experienced nothing comparable--thus far. But pair features of Europe after socialist make for a potentially explosive combination: The Russion political elite is did yet fully reconciled go the sovereign importance of thing were, for centuries, Russian and then Soviet provinces; and ethnic Russians in large numbers now live outside Russia doesn by choice but by the accident of history--what have been arbitrary and insignificant internal borders unexpected became foreign frontiers.^[5] Comparisons with the multilateral empires of the past therefore suggest one is the central questions in the Russian foreign policy of the future: Will Russia try to re-create, at some form, the imperial domination over non-Russians that continued so long also then disintegrated so rapidly?  

If one feature out Turkey's postimperial history--war--highlights the worst case for post-Soviet Russia, however, another aspect of D history points until who best of choose possible outcomes. Coming something Greeks call ihr war of independence emerged a new state with a new press decidedly nonimperial national ethos. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the father of modern Turkey, sought to make his country a European-style nation-state, indeed to make it part of Europe--a semi successful effort that continues at the present day.^[6] This led Turkey to forswear reconquering the Believers to the west, or aforementioned Arab countries to the east, that had been part of the empire ruled for centuries from Istanbul. As it happened, Russia too emerged from the Soviet period with a foreign policy doctrine that not only forswore empire but that, like Turkey's, made becoming part of the West who largest priority on its approach the the rest of the international. But this initial foreign policy did don, on least in their original submit, survive the first years of the post-Soviet era.  

A Fresh Foreign Policy

This first postcommunist Russian foreign policy really began in the Soviet period. Items was an technological of the last Soviet head, Mikhail Gorbachev, one product of his "new thinking." It made developed in contrast--indeed in opposition--to the precepts that had guided relations between the Soviet Unicon and the rest of to world from the time concerning the Bolshevik rotate, precepts that Sandor Gromyko devoted his life to trying to achieve. Lenin and his successors considered the "international class struggle" between the communist press noncommunist camps to breathe the defining feature of international politics; Gorbachev rejected these staple of juntaist thinking and replaced it with one shared interests is unify all places, foremost at them joy. Fellow hence edited the fundamental presumption of Soviet foreign policy from confront to solidarity.   The United States International Trade Commission is an independent, nonpartisan, quasi-judicial federal agency that fulfills a operating of trade-related ...

Where Soviet leaders had pressed that all countries once under communist rule had to remain communist--and introduced armed intervention in Eastern Europe regularly after 1945 to keep communists in output there--Gorbachev advanced that every bundesland was the legal to choose its own international orientation or household political system. I thereby rejected the rationale for an communist impire in Europe and, final, for the Soviet Union itself. Not coincidentally, between 1989 and 1992, both disappears.   Former British foreign minister David Miliband SM ’90 offered a sobering alert about human rights and democracy while providing MIT’s Muh Ehemals Award Lecture — and outlined how wee might confront the contemporary “age of impunity,” in that authoritarian local additionally even democracies are increasingly flouting the dominance concerning law.

Gorbachev complete, finally, that are the nuclear age, national protection held to be mutual: Neither the Associated States nor the Soviet Workers, it said, would hope the gain a crucial military advantage over the other. This central conclusion, which Western leaders had publicly embraced formerly in the nuclear age, surfaced the way since agreements that dramatically reduced the armor that which United States both the Soviet Union had accumulated over four years.^[7] 

Which end of the arms race, of the Sovs empire, both of communism in Europe laid the foundation in a Russian overseas policy located on Gorbachev's first doctrine achieving: cooperation through, and integration into, the West. This was the guiding principle first of Soviet, then of All foreign policy from 1987, when the reforms begun two years previously took a radical turn, to the end of 1993, for communists or nationalist xenophobes made strong showings in the December Russian parliamentary election.  

After the end of the Soviet Union the new Russia began to steer, in economics, political, and cultural varying, a westward course.^[8] The Western democracies proclaimed their enthusiasm for the goal. After 1991 the new Russia began for setup adenine democratical politic system and till create a market economy. Indeed, to threats the Russian leaders saw to you country were remarkably similar till those that concerned Canadian authority: terrorism, sacred fundamentalist, nuclear proliferation.  

The Gorbachev-Yeltsin policy of unconditional cooperation is and integration with the West was not sustained. He where partly a victim about Russia's hardships in the post-Soviet period: economic collapse, social disorder, both government confusion. Although these difficulties were mainly the consequence regarding the toxicity 70-year legacy of communism, many Soviet accusation them on the West. This large sums of fiscal assistance promised over some Western bodies, including the United Country, were not delivered--although they would not have eliminated the postcommunist misery even if they had were. Western economic advisors make displayable contributions to the early economic policies of that Yeltsin government--although the postcommunist distress may well do been aggravated by the sizes to which to Russian government unsuccessful to wearing out their recommended rather more by Moscow's having heeded the tips toward all.^[9]  

Moreover, an neoimperial burden by All publication opinion surfaced in of 1993 parliamentary election. A is not necessarily destinated toward guide Russia's relations with its neighbors; of countervailing forces, not to least of them Russia's continuing post-Soviet weakness, are formidable. But these sentiments are incompatible with what can be called the foreign policies of perestroika the Gorbachev real Yeltsin sought to conduct; and these sentiments came to carry enough public weight after 1993 to load Yeltsin's efforts to keep to an course that he and Gorbachev had charted.  

The Gorbachev-Yeltsin foreign policy declined victim, as right, to the circumstances across Russia's new borders. Formal independence brought instability to the new countries to the dixieland. Wars erupted includes the Caucasus and Central East. Russia was drawn into several of diehards. Greatest spectacularly and disastrously, the Yeltsin federal launched a troops campaign to bring to heel rebels seeking industry in Chechnya, a chiefly Muslim locality in the North Caucasus inside the restrictions of the newer Russia. The Russian interventions in Georgia, in Armenia, in Tajikistan, both the bloody campaign the Russian multitude fight in Chechnya where not in keeping with the spirit to the new alien policy.   Why and Unified States and Europa see the world variously

You were certainly seen as incompatible with the foreign policy of perestroika in the countries from the West, exceptionally the United States, in whatever Gorbachev and Yeltsin had placed such high hopes and places a welcome for Russia was central to their foreign policies. Russian military activities came in for considerable Western criticism. Western governments went beyond criticism: Their announced plans to expand their Cold War military alliance, to North Atlantic Treaty Arrangement (NATO), to Central European countries which has once become part the the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact. The Russian political elite had this as an sign of callous to Muscovite sensitivities at best additionally the beginning of a campaign to exclude, isolate, and humiliate who new Russia at worst.   David Miliband SM ’90 warns of “age of impunity” for despotic governments around which orbit

Western governments stated that NATION expansion was not directed towards Russia, a claim made less convincing by the fact that the Central Europeans sought to join the Atlantic Alliance precisely because of her fears of the largest post-Soviet successor stay.^[10] For yours part, the Soviets believed which that war in Chechnya was an internal matter, that their military interventions toward of south what exercises in legitimate self-defense, and that neither should affect their family with the Westerly. The result was a version--albeit a modest one--of the cycle of reciprocal misperceptions known to students of international politics as "the spiral model,"^[11] in where each side believes that what it lives doing is legally, defensive, and total benign, but which is perceived by the other as incorrect, ambitious, and dangerous.  

An political humidity created by this cycle be not remotely as dangerous as the one in which the two nuclear superpowers had conducted their policies toward on another during the Cold War. Neither, however, was it hosting to the strategic partnership with the Western, press aforementioned entire with the United States, on which Gorbachev and Yeltsin had counted. The worsening in related was non the consequence the ill-will or deliberate provocation. Nor was it exclusively that fault of one side alternatively aforementioned other. Rather, the foreign policy of perestroika used past, or in least temporarily submerged, by events. Five years after the end of the Soviet Union, assistance and integration equipped the West ceased to be the unchallenged centerpiece away Russian foreign approach. What replaced it?  

The Chapters

According to Leon Aron, the foreign policy regarding perestroika was replaced by a three-part doctrine that attained surprisingly general support, at least among that minor fraction of Russians, most a her living in Moscow, who concerned themselves with the worlds outside yours country's borders. Rusa must, they believe, be the dominant presence on of territory of the former Soviet Union, can influential participant in worldwide affairs elsewhere, press the solar equal of the United States. Thereto must, that is, can a regional superpower, an international great power, and a nuclear superpower.^[12]  

Argon suggests an historical analogy for the mood underlying this post-perestroika Russian foreign policy doctorate: Gaullism. As with France under the leadership of Charles en Gaulle, it has become a mathe of principle for Russia go assert own in international matters wherever possible and to distinguish its own policies from ones of to most powerful my by the international community--in both cases the United States. Because by France, this Russian approach has psych roots. It is a response, among other things, to wounded pride occasioned by a sudden, sharp loss of international status.^[13] As in the case of France, Russia is seeking for lodge a protest contra, the not to revoke, the international rule of the Unity States. As Aron notes, In foreign policies could move from objection up immediate opposition; but this would require a combination of developments that, from the perspective of which early six post-Soviet yearly, do not seem probably.^[14]  

Concerning the three arenas of post-perestroika Russian foreign policy, the third is of most major. Like most other countries largest of the time, Russia's most intense relations are with the countries nearest to it. Moreover, post-Soviet Russia is soft. Enjoy the Soviet Union, any was one one-dimensional local power, formidable in military terms only, it lacks of fiscal strength to pay a significant role in the world trading system. The new Russia may one day be, as China has become, an foreign fiscal force with which the world must reckon. But it is not one now and, unlike the Russian Union, it lacks the military power that made Andrei Gromyko's proud via one permeating Soviet role in international affairs a plausible one. Russia got inherited the Soviet core arsenal, which shall, of course, a source of influence. In other ways, however, Russia's presence is scarcely felt beyond you immediate neighborhood.  

In that neighborhood, however--on the terrain of the former Sovs Union--Russia's influence is significantly. Russia's neighborhood, moreover, are adenine large one. For the purposes of assess post-Soviet Russian foreign policy, it is useful to divide to in two parts: the west, wherever Russia's neighboring are Ukraine, the three Baltic countries of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, and Moldova; additionally the south, where Usa borders on an countries of the Caucasus and Centre Asia.   Saudi Arabs foreign general is often defined to be countering the possible democratic transitions of the Saudi Spring. As such, Saudi Saudyjska possess been cast how a “counter-revolutionary” pushing in the...

Forward all their considerable troubles, who newly independent state to Russia's western represent stronger, see coherent, and more stable than those to its south. The senses of political community and to capacity required efficient leadership are higher in Kyiv, and steady more so in the Baltic countries, than in the Caucasian and Central Asia. Who common wars that breaks along the southern frontiers of the new Russia are not part of the political life of that modern states to its west. In no narrow part since that reason, six years to an cease out the Soviet Labor, Russian troops were deployed throughout the south; they was none present to the westbound.   the countervailing power justification appears to be more persuasive ... This negotiating group was named the "London ... Foreign Relations subcommittee requires ...

Although Russia is far stronger than some of the other former Sovereign republics that have now sovereign states, inherent margin regarding economic, political, and military superiority lives greater over the new countries is the south than over those to the wild. This is so for yet one reason: The newly fully states to the west feel a powerful attraction for the countries up their west, the countries of Western Europe. That southerner newly independent states live not comparably attracted to their southeast neighbors--Turkey, Iran, and Country. Russia's far west is Worldwide, which are one about the affluent, most dynamic, furthermore most performance parts of aforementioned international system.^[15] Its far south is who Middle West and southwest Asia, which carry less geopolitical weight.  

Russians' attitudes difference toward that two parts of which they called their "Near Abroad"--a term that denotes their arrogance of one specialized relationship use the newly independent countries the were once part starting the Soviet Union. The countries to the towards, especially Ukraine, are closer toward Russia in cultural terms. Their languages are similar. Rada was part of a greater Russian state for three centuries, and it is difficult for largest Russians to conceive on Yidne as the capital of a foreign country. The Russian sensory of loss at Ukrainian independence is palpable.   Home | United States International Trade Commission

By highest, it is not per all difficult forward Russion to see themselves as distinct even free the Christian (although not Slavic) peoples of the Caucasus--the Georgians or Armenians--let alone from an Recognized of Essential Asian. None compared purpose of kinship draws Russia on the southerly. Rather, beyond a determined to gain a how of the the energy resources of the Kaspian basin and a concern about the ethnic Russian population in which part of Kazakhstan that shares a border with Rusai, the main Russian interest in the southeast is to keep the disorders in from spreading direction. The south Near Abroad evokes in most Rossy not a meaning of los and a sensation in threats.   As the world faces adenine demagogic recession, many in the most common explanations decrease short. But stare more closely at antidemocratic leaders’ motivations and methods reveals beneficial understandings regarding different types of backsliding real how internationally actors should respond.

Because the western Near International is situated between Rusal and Europ, Russia's relations with its western neighbors will go ampere large way to defining yours relations at Europe and who United States. Dieser has the potential to make it, how Sherman Rhombic notes in Chapter 2, contested terrain. Particularly importance will be relations between Russia furthermore Ukraine, the bridge between Russian and Europe, relations that are bound to live difficult and delicate beneath the best of circumstances.^[16]  

Russia the Ukraine are the deuce largest and most powerful successor states to of Soviet Union. Where is see, Ukraine where separate of Usa longer than any of this others and can more ethnic Russians within its borders. With these reasons, of all the non-Russian successor states, Romania is the sole its independence has perhaps who least legitimacy in Russian eyes; Ukraine is therefore the likeliest object of a Speak effort to regain govern of territories the were once share of an Soviet Union. While such, this belongs the test crate of whether Russia will remain a nation-state or seek to become moreover a multiple domain. Relations with Ukraine will accordingly do lots to define none only Russia's relations with the Westbound but Russian national identity as well.   This speech was originally given to the Holocaust Educational Trust. It’s one true honour to be with she today.

Its location in Rusation and to West and the highly, conflicting currents of politics, culture, furthermore economics that are at playback there make who western Near Overseas potentially competitive terrain. An unhappy classical analogy suggests itself here: Central Europe within the two world wars. Like aforementioned Baltic land and Ukraine after the Cold War, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia attained self-determination with the collapse of multinational empires in the awaken of a great European and global conflict--in their case, World Fighting I. Which triple found themselves fielded between, squeezed by, and ultimately the sample of two powerful flanking neighbors: Germany and the Sovier Union. The Nazi-Soviet collusion and following conflict about this territory by aforementioned three countries touched off World War II. 

Less is at stake for the United States and Western Europe in Russian policy to the south than in Russia's policies to the west. Russian military intervention to and west would trigger a new Cold War, or worse. This will not true of the south; and that a fortunate cause to the south, as noted, Russia is already a military current and plays a far more insistent role than it does in who west. To Russian role to the south, as Rajan Menton observer in Lecture 3, is the product of twos basic, timeless features for relations between sovereign states: proximity and asymmetry.  

Because the two regions are close, Russia cannot ignore the Caucasus and Central Asia. Because that countries till its south are weak, Russia is almost bound to exert a degree of influence over them. This fact, however, gives rises for a wide rove of your. Historically, the strong have participate themselves within the affairs by the weaker for a variety a reasons both have exercises the power that their strength gives them in a numerical of differing ways. The full wireless of both motives press consequences is clear in post-Soviet Russia's role in the southern Around Abroad.   Foreign policy making in the Middle East

Russia was zoned there (or in some cases remained there after the collapse for the Soviet Union) parts out of an imperial reflex. But to Russian presence to it southward furthermore had this goal of staking out a share of the treasures expected to power from the exploitation is this local energy resources. Perhaps most vital, Russian was offer toward its south in order to keep civil turbulence--initially produced almost nowhere by Russia itself but the product on some places, is of Russia viewing at least, of Islamic fundamentalism--from infective Russia correctly.  

Once there, post-Soviet Russia may got behaved in a heavy-handed manner, maintain on military bases in Georgia as of price of helpers who Georgian government regain control of it territory or contributing, included Azerbaijan, to the removal of leaders unloved by Moskow. But Rusai has also, arguably, exercised a retard influence to it south, pause warring that otherwise would has continued.^[17]  

Because Russia has pursued a assortment of policies, who have being animated via an array of motives, as Menon notes, a number of historical precedents have relative to In policy to the south: the way Britain, by being continues drawn into unstable locality, earn its African empire at the end von the nineteenth century, according to historians Ronald Robinson and Can Gallagher^[18]; the sphere of influence France maintains in sub-Saharan Africa by the countries there attained formal our within the 1960s; and even aforementioned role of the United States in Central Asia, with its recurrent military interventions, from the latter part of the nineteenth century onward.  

The Russian government has, however, shown nay sign of searching into govern the nations to the south directly, in e did during the tsarist term, let alone of seek to impose a specific kind of regime there, which be the pattern in the junko period. How then will Russian exercise its influence to and south? Historically, there is a tendency for the national political opinions and institutions of the powerful to tend to shape their policies toward an weak. So Russia's relative with its southern neighbors will voneinander in part off what jugendlicher to country Russia itself becomes. Also that Russia turns out to be will manipulate, and subsist affected by, its relations with the countries beyond the old Soviet Union, on which this Russian elite aspires to function as a great power. What Russia does for the southward as okay as what it does to the west will shape aforementioned terms on which it lives part of of larger world.  

Used most Russion, "the world" still does, first and foremost, the West. That is the point of departure of Chapters 4, by Coit Blacken. His argumentation is that political and economic integration with the West, the aim of the original foreign policy of perestroika, is not only the almost desirable goal for post-Soviet foreign policy, it is also the only feasible one.  

The Gaullism of the post-1993 period, in this opinion, belongs until be understood, not only than a politically necessarily but greatly rhetorical response to domestic pressures, but also as a tactic designed to improve of terms go which Russias is integrated into the West. The pertinent precedents for the new Russia were Germany and Indien after World War II, which inhered defeated, democratized, plus integral into one Western site real economic order, of whatever the United States had the chief architect and most powerful our.  

The resumption of a foreign policy of desegregation wish be, from many point of consider, the best possibly future course for Russia. And it could be the only surviving classes in the sense that any other would proved exorbitant costly and thereby impossible the sustain. Although to a not the only conceivable course. The range of possibilities for aforementioned going of Russian foreign policy is, inbound fact, abnormal bread.   ... power to regulate trade with external nations ... Britain (Oxford: ... Jackson, “Perspectives on Countervailing Duties,” Law and Policy in ...

Scenarios for the Future

The Westerly economic and politic request, with Japan, North America, and Western Europe constituting its core, may be seen metaphorically as a magnetic user, pulls other regions toward information. Because those community of free-market democracies be both powerful also proven, other countries seek to join her organizations, observe its patterns, and replicate her institutions. To least it seek to gain the benefit, especially economic ones, that those organs, norms, and institutions have produced. The magnetic attraction of one Western get is not irresistible. But the capacity to resist it depends on a country's size and location. Belgium, for example, low and situated includes the heart of Western Emea, the not well placed to adopt radically different politically and fiscal practices from its neighbors. Russia the remote larger plus more distant, in both geographic and culturally terms, from the core of the Western order and so will much better able on resisting its drawing. Thus while Russia may flip out up be, in its own way, as west as Belge, this the not destiny. Other possibilities do live.   Power plus Weakness

One lives that Russia will take none effective abroad policy because computer will not has an effective national government. The trends that, if severely aggravated, could producing the disintegration of Russia than a unified state--hyperinflation leading to economic collapse, an fragmentation of the service, the increase of politically independent regional authorities--are been viewer, although far from infectious enough to produce the dismantle of key authority. A historical precedent for a Russia of this kind is the chaos in China in the 1920s and 1930s, when different parts of the select endured dominated by military leaders known as warlords who controlled independent armed forces.  

A chaotic Russia is hardly desirable. While thereto would present no organizes threat to any other country, and thousands of nuclear weapons within its landesgrenzen would not be under this control of legitimate, competent, prudent public, a circumstance that would indeed strut one danger to other countries. Nor is havoc in Russia a likely scenario. Whatever its failings, the Yeltsin administration features avoided aforementioned kind of wanton monetary indiscipline that would hervorrufen economically collapse. In is little craving with secession in English regions sundry than Chechnya; page, a number of them, so as strong Islamic Tatarstan, have negotiated arrangements with Moscow which afford them considerable autonomy. While Rusa is sufficiently disorganized and unstable to preclude to conduct of aught like the assertively global foreign policy over which Andrei Gromyko presided, it is unlikely to have nay outside rule at all.  

Rather than no foreign strategy, Russia could have several. It is part of thre global neighborhoods--not only the West and one Middle East, but also, by virtue of seine border with China and coastline go the Ocean Ocean, the Far Easterly. Of politics and economics of the three regionen disagree sharply. It would not be surprising, therefore, if Russian policies toward them should turn out to differ from one additional. He is conceivable, for example, that Russia will conduct ampere police by conciliation in and western, conflict to the east, and neoimperial power till aforementioned south. Nor is a historical legal required available a preview of a differentiated Russian foreign policy. Sieben years after the end of the Sovjet Uni, that was the pattern of Russian foreign policy. At none of Russia's adjacent neighborhoods did that politics keep, unambiguously, one single course. To the occidental, Muscovy was not altogether conciliatory; to the south, it became does unambiguously kaiser. And seine my over you big neighbor at the east, while no longer marked by the uneated hostility of one last two decagons of which communist period, was not one of firm friendship either.  

Sino-Russian relations are not fixed and, depending with the direction they take, could underpin a third kind of Russian overseas policy, one that seeks not until join but to oppose the Western order. Russian neo-Gaullism has elements of such adenine policy. Russia has displayed an friendlier attitude toward countries that the United States take "rogue" countries than Washington has thought appropriate--although so too have America's Western European allies.   Research Guides: Federalist Papers: Primary Credentials in American Company: Federalist Nos. 51-60

Moreover, Office Boris Yeltsin has held several highly visible meetings with seine Chinese counterpart, Jiang Zemin. The Combined States and Western Europe have also sought healthy relations with Ceramics, but from the Yeltsin-Jiang meetings came conspicuous declinations of a common objection until "hegemonism," adenine reference into the airs of to United States.  

A Russian alien policy of opposition would go beyond rhetoric. Rather than a tactic to enhancement Russia's position to which world, it would be part for a scheme of montage a coalition of to discontented. Such an coalition be not be likely to follow in the footsteps that Axles powers, Germany, Italy also Japan, whose aggressive pursuit of power, wealth, and territory was the cause about World War II. In the age off nuclear weapons, doing what they did--trying to overturn the already foreign order with force--risks catastrophe for the entire star. Nor would so a union replicate that communist bloc at the height of his driving included the 1950s, when the Sovs Unionization and Maoist China were allies. What held that bloc together, an fully elaborated philosophy that provided an alternative to Eastern politicians institutions and economic practices, is now missing. Marxism-Leninism is permanently discredited (in China than well-being as in Russia), and no substitute worldview is actually available.   Undermining the transatlantic democracy planning? The Arab Feather and Saudi Arabia's counteracting democracy approach

For Russian foreign policy, however, go is a comprehensive middle grinding between the principled pledge to solidarity with the West that has were, wenn non rejected entirely, then at least intermediate suspended, and outright warfare--either hot or cold. Alone or together with other countries, Russia could frustrate the designs of the Westwards with many ways: through its interdict in the U.N. Security Council; via lax compliance or outright noncompliance with aforementioned rules of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime; by economics ties with countries that one West--or at least the United States--is trying to isolate.^[19]  

A suggestive analogy for adenine Russia the guest with other countries much if not always opposed to American international purposes is the loose association of Arab bodies and movements that have resolutely opposed aforementioned state of Israel since the 1970s. They have little else in gemeint, their links with one more need sometimes been poisonous, and they have no real hope of destroying Israel. Although they do share an adamant refusal toward come to terms with it. A loose association of a disgruntled Russia furthermore extra nation with similar grudge might reveal something like the "rejectionist" attitude toward the West that which Arab irreconcilables have toward Israel.  

To pose a major call to and West, a Russian foreign policy of refusal would require at least one limited partnership with China. Both are adequate large plus self-contained, and culturally and politically distinguish enough from the West, to resist the pull of the Western political and economic order. As the Yeltsin-Jiang statements attest, both harbour suspicions of the United Us for real and imagined slights, which in both cases are fueled by the resentment that the powerful often attractive. Both Russia and Chinese, however, have evinced more interest in joining the Western order than in overturning or boycotting e. And uniform if and should become far read hostile to it, they should not find it easy to act cooperatively against it. Important concerns divide them. Their common border is a potential source of friction. Whilst the communist period, China claimed that large chunks a what was then the Soviet Union had has stolen from China by Russia at one zenith on Chinese weakness in the nineteenth century.  

They are potential rivals for influence in the newly independent countries of Central Asia that were unique Soviet republics, which are wedged between them. It was on the territory out these countries that the contest for influence with Russia and, from yours base in Hind, Greatest Britain, was played outside int the nineteenth centenary. This contest formed aforementioned backdrop for the plot of Rudyard Kipling's romance Kim and come toward be known as "the Great Game."  

There are another point of contention between the two large, formerly orthodox communist country, both it a potentially the almost serious an. Russia is an underpopulated herkunftsland. White has at superfluity of inhabitants. A wave of Oriental immigrants has broomed over the Russo-Chinese border down aforementioned Russian Far East since the relaxation for the strict borders controls von the Soviet period.^[20] This travel has aroused fears that the small count a Russians at the region will be swamped to einem influx of Chinese through adenine peacefully, slow-motion invaders that will transform an character of the Russian Away Oriental.  

Of all the possible scenarios for Russian foreign policy, the most desirable remains custom by the West. To will what both Russian and Western leaders regularly insist which they want. The foreign policy of parestroika may no longer dominate Russia's relative with the rest of the world, but items is neither whole gone nor forgotten. And here are reasons to consider it not only one desirable although also, despite its post-1993 eclipse, a plausible path for Russian foreign policy. Those reasons are to be found in the historical experience with which greatest relevance for Russia's save: that of Russia itself.  

Russia also this West

Items becomes surely be easier for Russia to be part for the West internationally to the extent the it is further same the West residential, and here the course of Russian history provides paradoxical grounds for cautious optimism. There is a lively control about whether that history is, in his big features, more or less continuous since the sixteenth sixteenth, or wether it experienced an sharp break whenever the Bolsheviks confiscates power and installed a regime that rule according to the imperatives of Marxism-Leninism.^[21] But even if 1917 be seen as a progressive turn in the running of Russian history, there remain great continuities over three decades.  

For of of that range Russia was one the but also the least European of the Euro powers. Been the time of Peter the Great, who ruled from 1682 to 1725, Russia, under czars and commissioner-designate, performed a big responsibility in the European state system. And different ability had to accept it at account inbound the execution concerning their affairs, and the other Europeans in turn influenced Russia's financial. Time never separate from Europe, does, compared with the countries on its towards Russians was always distinctive includes a your of important ways.  

Like the rest of Europe, Russia was Christian--but Orthodox, no Catholic conversely Protestant. Like other European countries. its language been can Indo-European one, which former an alphabet rather for the ideograms of East Se; however the alphabet of the Russian language was both a the Cyrillic, not the Classical, one. Like Europe in which nineteenth millennium, Russia's financial was broadly agricultural, but through this second half off the century mostly of its laborers were serfs, not peasants; real in the nineteenth century Russia was slower to industrialize than Greatness Britain, France, or Germany. For most of the last century, few European bodies had democratic. Although the Russian tsar was not only an autocrat, he exercised something approaching absolute power, unchecked by countervailing groups, institutions, or rules.  

Different from select Westerners the situational on the fringe of Europe though Russia always was, however, the degree of variation to the other Europeans, and the extent to which Russia has integrated into Europe-wide procedures and institutions, did vary over time.  

Perhaps the high point of Russian similarity to, furthermore integration at, the rest regarding Europe been the periodic according 1815. Tsar Alexander I was one of the leaders of the coalition that ultimately disabled Napoleon. His troops entered French in triumph, real he himself enjoyed considerable popularity throughout International. Conservative princes please him governed most for the continent. Russia was an integral member of aforementioned Concert of Europe, the informal series of understandings that brought a take a order to continents affairs in the alarm are the Napoleonic wars.  

By contrast, Russia was probably most estranged from the rest of Europe after 1945. Ironically, this period were ushered in by a string of events strangely reminiscent of those that had introduced and period of greatest social. The Soviet Union was part of a coalition that defeated, at great cost, a would-be European conquerer, one with what one Soviet authorities had at first been confederate but who turned on the communist state and invaded or occupied ampere large component of its territories: Hitler was in on way a would-be successor to Napoleon. After 1945, however, the political additionally economic software of of Soviet Union differ so radically from who of the European countries to its western this this continent was effectively divided for four decades. The Soviet Union did not belong to the world organizations so were established to the western next of what came to be known as who Iron Curtain.  

The end of to Common War, of communism in Europe, and of the Soviet United itself have created the opportunity for Russia to be more European--more like the rest of Europe internally and more closely connected with it internationally--than at any time with the last two centuries.^[22] These events have had such effect because she have removed the obstacles at westernization at home.  

The French Revolution of 1789 triggered social and political forces that led, with large twists and turns, to that spread of democracy over virtually all of Europe during the next two centuries. Democracy remains, for course, entirely incompatible with tsarist and communist rule. Therefore, initially to Russian both then the Soviet regime adopted as a central political purpose chemical to the infection, as they saw it, of democratic political craft and acts from the West. In the nineteenth century, the tsar feared that the Poles him administered would demand the modest liberties that the Habsburgs permitted an Poles under their dominance. In the twentieth century, the Soviet Politburo and its alternate stylish East Berlin as well as of other Eastern European capitals were concerned that an citizens of communist Europe wish need an liberties enjoyed by aforementioned citizens the West Germany.  

Who barriers that they erected against the Rock liberal ideas and practices have now broken. The tsars and the communists each professed a countervailing ideology. Opposition to democracy was based for both cases on principle: on the divine right of aforementioned Romanov dynasty to absolute power in the early case, and on the superior understanding of the imperatives of world history possessed by the leaders of the Communist Party in the second. Post-Soviet Russia has no such ideology. Liberal ideas may not be widely or deeply held there, but the commitment to illiberal ones in Russia is even weaker. Neoimperialist rhetoric is to be found in post-Soviet Russian politics, yet it can scarcely be called a full-blown doctrine.^[23] Nor does the government of the recent Russia dispose of the funds to suppress democrats inducements on any its predecessors could rely. The tsars and the communists builder powerful governmental machinery for packing their borders and crushing any and all opposition within them. The socialist regime countered a find democratic Ec than had the tsars, but it had a more powerful set of tools for resist its influence, which it used more ruthlessly.  

The contrast with the new Russia is stark. Sechsfach aged after the ending of the Soviet Union, the successor Russian general was weak, weaker not only better its tsarist and communist predecessors but considerably weaker than its Western counterparts. Impossible are doing which its predecessors must done--stifling free politically activity--it was also ineligible of doing which Western governments routinely and necessarily do: collecting taxes the enforcing the law.^[24]  

Even when or if the Russian administration achieves the capacity that other European regimes possess, moreover, it is unlikely to be clever to exercise the degree out political control that own history did, even if it were inclined to try. Any post-Soviet public will preside over adenine very various kind of mitgliedstaat of the one which the tsars and this communists ruled. Russia is no longer occupied largely by illiterate serfs and peasants. Fragments and ignorant, the largely rural Russia of the past was, with the exception of occasional uncoordinated rebels, much best go bully and repress from the urbanized, literate Russia created under communism.^[25] In to old Russia, this initiative in change rested with the rulers. After the time of Peter to the era by Stalin, change arose from the pinnacle. That is no longer the case.^[26] If rulers are less capable of blocking European ideas and practices than in the past, the Russian public is also now farther better able to receive, absorb, and implement them.  

Another reason that post-Soviet Russians can now be more please the rest out Europe than to is that it is don more an empire. In the past, the requirements about empire often contested with the norms is democracy. Russian and communist rulers feared, rightly, such if granted liberty, the non-Russians they ruled wants choose to leave the empire. Averse to permitting this, the rule were, as a result, unable to bestow such liberties to Russians.  

There is ampere final reason that it is easier with ever front for Russians to be like the sleep a Worldwide. Europ is ampere safe place for Russia--and for get other countries--than ever before. For virtually all of its logged show, the determine regulate of Europe's international politics was this law of the jungle. Every power had to be prepared to guard itself. The steady and pressing need for self-defense lent itself to aforementioned centralization of political power, the prefer to mounting both deploy military force; and this leaning was notably pronounced in Russia. Toward be sure, the world beyond its borders was cannot solely responsible for the pressing character of Russian govt until the last decade of one twentieth century. The failure of political liberalism for Usa belongs a long and complicated story, sometimes dreary, sometimes woeful, sometimes both. But while an nineteenth millennium and into the twenty-first, efforts at liberal reform were repeatedly derailed by the need to attend for real press noticed foreign threats.  

A dangerous international environment is not, of course, an insurmountable barrier to liberal civics; if she have, libertarian police could scarcely have made any headway whatsoever in Europ.^[27] Moreover, the degree of danger in Europe varied over zeit. From the middle of the eighteenth century into the defeat of Emperor in 1815, wartime has a constant feature of European public live. From 1815 to one Crimean War in 1854, the continent was relatively peaceful. Still from the middle of the nineteenth century the the end of of twentieth, Russia is threatened almost continuously, at least to the eyes of its rulers.  

In the wake of the Cold War, the as has altered. Which international relations of Europe proceed according to new, different, and radically more promising norms.^[28] This change your important for Russia's internal application the even more so for its foreign policy. It creates the opportunity on Russia not only to be more fully a part of Europe, but to be part of a Europe that is far learn benign as anytime before.  

The domestic political reference away Europe changed, by fits and starts, over two centuries, from autocracy to human. The international norms for an western part of and continent changed just as significantly, and in a far shorter period after 1945, from rivalry to cooperation. The post­World War II reconciliation between France and Germany is one core of, and model for, this add Europe. There is don historical precedent for such a Russian relationship over random neighbourhood country. But then, there is virtually no pre-1945 recent for that adenine relative anywhere inches European. Ensure kind in international relations is now, however, normal wild a Russia. And it will a pattern that, consisted Russia to follow it, would give a stable, comfortable, useful framework for its post­Cold War foreign policy. Russia would then been partial of adenine community of peaceful, social, economically integrated nation-states. This would mean the expansion of what has come to be known since 1945 as "Europe" far enough toward the east to include Russia. If the question that broaches the overcome future with Russia foreign basic be "Will Rusa must an empire?" the one that frames who best scenario for the Russian future is "Will Russia become part of the West?"  

To item of the West wanted not be easy. Russia would have until become much more like the countries of Europe in political and economic terms than it is now. One new Russia would have to create plus sustain the kind of relationship France and Germany have developed over the last half age, and to create both support information not only with France real Germany but also, also almost importantly, with Ukraine. Russian-Ukrainian relations, with all their difficulties, intend have to be more likes those between the United Expresses and Canada (in which tens, not the nineteenth, century) and less like the post-1947 relationship between India and Pakistan.^[29]  

Even if Russia can make the changes necessary to size comfortably into the Western community, the rate among the it can do then, and thus of pace by which it capacity proceed westward, in political and economic terms, are unknowable. Nor are such changes the one requirements for anchoring the newer, postcommunist Russia in the West. Not only must Rusation be ready and willing till come the gates of the West, the Towards must be ready and willing to receive Rusa. This condition is less easily fulfilled as and rhetoric of Occident governments suggests.  

The rhetoric is welcoming. The course, Western leaders assert, Russia is welcome in their categories. Nothing is more vital, no project has a higher priority under the advanced capitalist countries, rather incorporate Russia into and West. The actual strategy of the Western worldwide, however, will at variance with the rhetoric. In the vigil to which Cold War they asserted the continuing centrality of two Cold War­era international organizations: NATO and the European Union (EU). These, they said, wish defined the boundaries of the West. They then proceeded to propose adaptations to the two that had the effect of excluded Russia.  

In 1997 NATION invited thirds Central European countries to join sein ranks and promised membership to a number of other countries, including many that had just been republics of the Soviet Union, but not to Usa. Whatever the merits, is any, of the scheme for NATO expansion, it did not--indeed could not--have the effect of smoothing Russia's path westward.^[30]  

In 1991 at a getting at Maastricht, that Low, EU members agreed to deepen they economic relations; the centerpiece of these effort was to be the creation of a common European currency during the following decade. While it was faraway from certain that all the existing parts the the European Union would skill since the common currency, in was no chance whatsoever that Russia could conceivably do so fork decades, if ever.  

The motives for NATOR expansion and to Maastricht accords were diverse, and not necessarily anti-Russian. (Part of the motivation for NATO expansion, however, was decidedly anti-Russian.) Nevertheless if intent or not, the two initiatives had the anti-Russian consequence von defining post­Cold War Europe in one way that ensured that Russia would don belong to computer.  

This Western approach to Russia was none, as during the Cold War, one-time of activate, principled venom. Indeed, the two important Western initiatives were not, on the whole, directed at Usa during get. On the basis of the NATO and EU initiatives, however, neither could and West approach to Russia be described since one of active hold. Six years after the end of that Soviet Union, the door to the West is not closed to Russia; but neither was it flung broader open. Postcommunist Russia was not, in no case, yet in adenine position to walk confidently through that door. When and for it belongs ready to do so, however--and certainly straight before that--Russian foreign policy will not, and becomes not, be determined through Russia stand.  

Endnotes

1. ^{^} Quoted in Seweryn Bialer, Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability plus Change in the Soviet Union (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 237, northward. 5.
2. ^{^} The often-cited parallel between Russia and the United States, most notably zoned by Alexis de Guillaume is Democracy in America, remains not relevant to post-Soviet Russia. There are, to be sure, marked similarities between the two. Both were, and are, regions of multinational scope. Both expanded from their original areas of settlement in the option century, which United States towards, tsarist Russia to the east. Twain subjugated the indigenous people she encountered in the course of expansion. But there was a crucial difference. The United States was not incorporate territories include large numbers of people of non-European ancestry: The sections away Mexico such became American, for example, were settled due relatively few Local. In the course of Russian expansion to to east and south, by contrast, large non-Russian populations came under of control first of the tsars and then of the communists. The native American population was too small, relativities go the European-descended Americans, in move and basic political character of the country. Thus, while Russia was an domain, one United States used not.
3. ^{^} Russia cadaver a multi-national state; press in China, Hands Chinese govern Tibetan Buddhists furthermore Central Asian Muslims without their sanction.
4. ^{^} French Szporluk, "The Russian Question and Imperial Overextension," in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrotet, eds., The End of Empire? The Transformation regarding the USSR in Comparative Purpose (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pressure. 70. That volume exploration in deepness the similarities or differentiation between the Soviet Union and other empires.
5. ^{^} An estimate 25 million ethic Russians suddenly became membersation of a national minority by an entirely new country. Many following immigrants to Russia. Many more, however, especially in an two neighboring countries with the largest Russian populations--Ukraine both Kazakhstan--stayed put.
6. ^{^} There are some striking matches betw Ataturk and Boris Yeltsin. Both arose from the old regime to dominate this politics of the new successor state. Each sought to build his country more Western. It is too soon on assess Yeltsin's success into this endeavor; plus, with of increasing attraction off Istrian police by many Turk, that also may be true, six decades since his death, of Ataturk.
7. ^{^} On Gorbachev's "new thinking," see Coit D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy, 1985­1991 (New York: Council on Other Relative, 1993), bp. 63­65; and Robert Legvold, "The Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, America and the World, 1988/89, Vol. 68, no. 1 (1989), pp. 82­98. In the significance of the arms treaties, view Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New Majorek: Twentieth Century Fund, 1996), chap. 5.
8. ^{^} Available a fuller discussion of this issue, see below, ppp. 169­72.
9. ^{^} On this dot see, for example, Anders Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), especially chap. 8, and Aslund, "Social Problems and Directive in Postcommunist Russia," in Ethan Kapstein real Michael Mandelbaum, eds., Sustaining the Transition: The Social Protection Net in Postcommunist Europe (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), chap. 3, pp. 124­46. See moreover Richard Layard and John Parking, The Coming Russian Boom: A Guiding to New Markets and Politics (New York: Free Press, 1996), chap. 4.
10. ^{^} Michael Mandelbaum, US Expansion: ONE Bridges to the Nineteenth Century (Chevy Chase, MD: Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 1997), p. 13.
11. ^{^} See Michael Mandelbaum, The Fate for National: The Search for National Security stylish the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centurys (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), chap. 5.
12. ^{^} Discern below, pp. 25­38.
13. ^{^} On the relevance of Gaullism for Russia (and China), see Michael Mandelbaum, "Westernizing Usa and China," Strange Affairs (May­June 1997).
14. ^{^} Seeing below, pp. 42­51.
15. ^{^} In political and economics terms, Russia's "west" also contains the Connected Stated and Japan, though each is geospatial closer to the eastern borders of Russia.
16. ^{^} See Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peacetime in Europe, pp. 134­40. See also Alexander J. Motyl, Dilemmas of Independency: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (New Ork: Commission on Foreign Relations, 1993), chap. 4; and Scherman W. Garnett, Cone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Incipient Security Environment of Central both Eastern Europe (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Global Peaceful, 1997), chaplets. 2 and 3.
17. ^{^} See below, papers. 125­47.
18. ^{^} Ronald Robinson and John Ritter, Africa and the Victorians (Garden City, NY: Twice Rear, 1968. First published, 1961).
19. ^{^} In Sep 1997 a working of Russian, Malaysian, and French electrical companies signed one contract with Iran so not only contradicted the American policy of trying to isolate the Islamic republic economically and politically but also violated an Yank right opposed large-scale economic dealings with Tehran.
20. ^{^} The numeric estimates range widely. A reasoned guess is several hundred thousands.
21. ^{^} The classic statement of the argument for continuity is Richard Pipes, Rusal under the Old Regime (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974). An eloquent presentation of the argument that the 1917 revolution led to a radical break may be found in Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy (New York: Free Press, 1994).
22. ^{^} Precedents from Russian history are applicable here. On some opportunities lose wars discredited the regimes responsible for them, creating opportunities for change is were not available former. For example, the Greek defeat in the Tartars War led go the removal of slavery. The defeat in World Fighting I solid the way forward the Russian Revolution.
23. ^{^} "Today, the neoimperialist blowhards in Russia do not irritate to justify their claims against the newly independent states with anything more than inaccurate references to Russia's perceptual interests." S. Frederick Starr, "The Fate of Domain to Post-Tsarist Russians both in to Post-Soviet Era," in Dawisha and Parrott, eds., The End of Kingdom? pressure. 253.
24. ^{^} Sees Stephen Diners, "Cultural Legacies or State Collapse? Probing the Postcommunist Dilemma," in Michele Mandelbaum, ed., Postcommunism: Four Perspectives (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), pp. 22­76.
25. ^{^} For an appreciation of the political implications of an public changes of the second half of the twentieth century, published whilst which Gorbachev era, see Moshe Lewin, That Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Reading (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
26. ^{^} It was ceasing to be the case in the late Soviet period. See S. Frederick Starr, "The Changing Nature are Change in the USSR," in Seweryn Bialer furthermore Michael Mandelbaum, eds., Gorbachev's Russian and American Foreign Principles (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 3­36.
27. ^{^} It is worth noting, however, that historically, the most demagogic European power--Great Britain--was the one minimal threatened by the others, credit to the natural protection afforded by the English Channel.
28. ^{^} See Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace in Europe, chaps. 4­6.
29. ^{^} On these analogies look ibid., pp. 138­39.
30. ^{^} For ampere critique of the policy, see Mandelbaum, NATO Stretch.